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1. Introduction: a relativist trend within informal logic
The explosion of developments in logic over the past 25 years deriving from the informal
logic movement, as complemented by studies in argumentation theory, pragma-dialectics, critical
thinking, and the new rhetoric, has been astounding. A signature feature of this compassing
movement treating argumentation1 is an extraordinary confluence of disciplines ― ranging from
psychology, sociology, linguistics, rhetoric, and classical textbook logic to phenomenology, and
cognitive science. This confluence has dramatically enriched and added new vitality to
discussions about argumentation. It has also tagged this movement as broadly multi-dimensional
and as replete with trends not all of which are equally compatible and some even contrary. This
situation has encouraged some critics to mark this as a serious limitation, citing the movement’s
lack of definition and apparent aimlessness; they might even venture to predict its eventual
dissolution, suggesting that its varied influences will become reabsorbed into traditional
disciplines. Nevertheless, informal logicians consider this situation not to detract from but to be
a positive feature of the movement, and they tout its special revolutionary and non-conventional
nature.
Another prominent feature of argumentation theory is its focus on reasoning just as a human
activity. This focus traces its origin at least as far back to its modern founders who sought to
avoid the ‘straits of formal logic’, such as Chaim Perelman, Stephen Toulmin, and C. L.
Hamblin. Indeed, allowing some broad stroke of definition, we take this feature to characterize
the nature and objective of the argumentation movement. This is not a surprising feature, since
an initial impetus for the new trend was a deep dissatisfaction with traditional formal logic, or,
better, with the putative progress of modern mathematical logic. In short, they assessed that
work in constructing abstract formal languages, recursion theory, quantification theory, the
axiomatization of number theory, mathematizing logic, proof-theory, power sets and set-theory,
and an inability to ‘formalize’ fallacies holds no promise for meeting the needs of ordinary
human beings making a living. Human beings are accustomed to using natural languages and
not abstract formal languages. For adherents of this new movement ― again, whether informal
logicians, pragma-dialecticians, or critical thinking theorists, etc. ― formal logic had excised
human beings from the reasoning process to render them inconsequential, passive onlookers only
to focus then on the sterile relations of propositions. And, after all, do propositions really exist?
This is all well and good, they have said, for the development of computers; but human beings
are not computers. Formal logic, it seemed to these iconoclastic thinkers, has little or no
relevance to what human beings actually do in their everyday lives. It could not offer practical
advice relating to problem solving, mediating differences, or assessing persuasive and
disputational discourse. Nor was it especially normative in respect of evaluating arguments ―
1
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the what human beings do when they argue, debate, persuade, mediate, make a point, draw a
conclusion, assess … that is, when they think. Informal logic emerged explicitly to address this
void, or failing, of formal logic, and it has done admirably well in carving a niche for itself. The
expectation is that informal logicians, and argumentation theorists generally, will continue to
make significant contributions to understanding human reasoning.
Argument evaluation, or argument assessment, then, has emerged as a special concern among
argumentation theorists. They have been occupied in great measure to answer the question
‘What are the marks of a good argument?’ Its persuasiveness? The acceptability of its
premises? Its cogency? An absence of fallacies? Clear language? The truth of its premises? Its
validity? All of these constituent aspects of an argument ― even what counts as an argument ―
have been extensively considered and continue to be examined by these logicians. It is worth
noting that the assessment of the traditional fallacies, the so-called ‘informal fallacies’, might
locate a historical genesis for these logicians. And they have composed a vast literature on these
‘bad arguments’. Just here informal logicians, pragma-dialecticians, and critical thinking
theorists have been especially dissatisfied with formal logic because they perceive an asymmetry
to exist between not formalizing fallacies and invalidity over against formalizing validity.
Indeed, formal logicians have not seriously taken up fallacious reasoning to develop a theory of
fallacy, either recognizing their inability or sloughing the matter as of little importance. In most
cases it is possible to demonstrate the validity of an argument by means of a deduction; there is a
long tradition to this effect and formal logicians have dealt extensively, if incompletely, with the
notion of deducibility. However, in respect of establishing invalidity, formalists have only the
methods of counterargument and counterinterpretation available to them.2 But these methods
introduce non-logical constants, which thereby might be thought to corrupt their formalism.
Now, while some logicians would formalize the assessment of the traditional fallacies, others are
not convinced that this formalism is properly the counterpart of, for example, a method using
such deduction rules as addition, simplification, detachment, and the equivalences.3 Rather, they
have searched for non-conventional ‘forms’ or patterns of reasoning. Douglas Walton and John
Woods stand out as logicians who have made significant contributions in this respect, and they
continue to move in this direction. On the other hand, there are developments, most notably
those of Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, that assess fallacies pragma-dialectically
as breaking the rules that manage a discussion or a debate or a mediation in which arguing is a
constituent part. Logic on this count effectively shifts from a concern for establishing validity or
objective knowledge to studying the rules that regulate discourse; logic becomes focused on the
pragmatics of discourse. Mediation, for example, might often suspend judgment about truth and
falsity in order to settle on a practical plan of action agreeable to opposing parties. Persuasive
argumentation might likewise sidestep concern with validity and truth in favor of obtaining a
desired end. These explorations into human activity have been productive and have found their
applications beyond classroom teaching ― or outside upper level seminars on recursion, omegacompleteness, and set theory ― in the real world of conflict resolution, legal argumentation, and
assessing the ‘rhetoric’ prominent in the political and commercial arenas. In any case, the study
of fallacious reasoning has been a soundboard against which models for assessing good
arguments are being developed.
It is fair to say that a third prominent feature of the argumentation movement is its focus on
epistemics, or, perhaps better, on cognition and intentionality. Human beings are thought to take
center stage on this count. In this connection, an argument or argumentation is not a lifeless
entity dwelling in a platonic universe and consisting in static propositions and sets of
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propositions and their static relationships, but a living, dynamic, and meaningful social activity.
An argument is an interaction between (or among) human beings ― it is dialectical, not
monolectical. Here argumentation theorists emphasize study of the inferential links that persons
experience when they reason through a discourse rather than study more strictly the implicational
relationships among propositions. Taking this tack has opened wide the doors of argumentation
evaluation to the scrutinizing lenses of psychology, cognitive science, rhetoric and linguistics,
and to the social sciences in general.
Now, while argumentation theorists have undeniably secured enduring accomplishments, we
wish in this discussion to address a concern that some movement logicians might be veering off
course in an important respect. Studying the subjectivity of inferential links threatens to draw
the movement close to, or even into, psychologism and phenomenological analysis. This
tendency has not gone unnoticed by some movement adherents who want to maintain that the
truth of the premises contributes to a given argument’s being a good argument or that a fallacy is
not just an appearance in someone’s consciousness or someone’s perception but something
objective about an argument. Premise acceptability, a generally recognized feature of a good
argument, might, then, include the premises being true, as Ralph Johnson seems to maintain.
Still, this requirement is not unanimously accepted as necessary; Chris Tindale makes such a
case and points to the relativism of notions of truth. Indeed, Trudy Govier has argued that
argument assessment is better off addressing the context of the argument, of the social activity,
since what is acceptable, or cogent, or even true, varies from one audience and context to
another. This trend among informal logicians and argumentation theorists, while perhaps not
defining the movement, nevertheless seems to be problematic just because of its relativism and,
perhaps, of an associated subjectivism.4 Taking this tack threatens a traditional principle of logic
to overcome ignorance and fallibility as much as possible. If argumentation theory shifts
concern from assessing objective implicational relations to how human beings cognitively make
inferences, then it might undercut a methodology that acknowledges error as other than a misstep
in an argumentation process. Mediation and persuasive discourse are cases in point. In this
connection, we witness a dialectical tension within the argumentation movement that promises
further discoveries. In any case, there is no pernicious intention among these thinkers, as even a
cursory reading of their works reveals a profound concern with the quality of human life. For
example, critical thinking textbooks have a decidedly critical posture toward ‘political rhetoric’
or legalese obfuscation and tricks of advertising that reveals their interest to empower ordinary
human beings with a sharp discerning capability. This posture helps to account for their focus on
context to get at the meaning of what is presented in one or another argument. Still, when we
introduce a classical concern of logic, here considered in relation to establishing objective
knowledge, then this trend is at least problematic toward realizing this end. We might ask
ourselves ― Is it possible for a human being to be mistaken about some matter or other? For
example, might a human being believe a given state of affairs to be the case when in fact the
given state of affairs is not the case? Such states of affairs might include matters relating to the
natural world, to societal relationships and interpersonal dynamics, and even to what transpires
during an argumentation. Merely to reply with “Who is to determine the criteria of truth?”
circumvents any genuine concern ordinary human beings might share about really knowing
‘what is happening’. Our caution does not aim to diminish the successes secured in studying
conflict resolution, mediation, fallacious reasoning, models of persuasion, and assessing
knowledge as socially constructed. Rather, it aims to encourage a dialogue with formal logic in
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order to examine a possible shortcoming of argumentation studies and to suggest a role formal
logic might play in strengthening such studies.
Table 1 sketches three kinds of argumentation and locates our focus on deductive reasoning
in respect of the other two. Treating only deductive reasoning, then, circumscribes our
discussion. On this count we omit considering extra-logical matters, not as unimportant for
promoting and assessing human ‘argumentative’ behavior, but not as crucial for promoting
intelligible discourse. We believe that the theoretical apparatus of formal logic can provide
models against which human beings can assess their success or failure to establish knowledge.
This apparatus is one among other important instruments available to human beings toward that
end. Argumentation theorists seem not to have placed obtaining knowledge at the forefront of
their concerns and we wish to raise interest about this matter. Below we first treat the need to
extract the propositions expressed by persons during argumentation. The notion of proposition is
clarified in the context of distinguishing the process and the product of an argumentation.
Second, we make a case for the objectivity of truth and falsity, of validity and invalidity, and of
cogency and fallaciousness. Here we provide more traditional notions of argument and
argumentation as consisting in propositions, which thereby make them susceptible to objective
analysis. Third, we outline what formal logic has to offer informal logic and argumentation
theory.
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KINDS OF ARGUMENTATION5

KIND
in respect of
OBJECTIVE

NORMATIVE CONCERN
with evaluation

CHARACTER

Good Argument
1

MEDIATION

Social activity
Dynamic of disputing
parties

Successful mediation

PERSUASION

Social Activity
Dynamic of agent &
audience

Successful persuasion

Premise acceptability, etc. is
context relative

3

TRUTH
or
OBJECTIVE
KNOWLEDGE

Not a social activity
Static relationships among
propositions
Cogency & validity are
context independent

Establishing knowledge
1. Deduction – knowledge
of logical consequence
2. Demonstration –
knowledge of the truth of
a conclusion

Table 1
5

CONCERN
with morality

Bad Argument

Failure to resolve a
dispute
A fallacy consists in
breaking a rule
managing disputational
discourse

Reasonableness & cogency,
etc. are context relative
2

⎯

CONCERN
with Truth & Falsity

Secondary
Might work with
pragmatist and
coherence notions of
truth & falsity

Failure to persuade

Secondary

A fallacy consists in
breaking a rule
managing persuasive
discourse

Might work with
pragmatist and
coherence notions of
truth & falsity,
possibly with
correspondence

Failure to establish
knowledge

Primary

3. Fallacy – a break in the
cogency of a deductive
discourse

Correspondence is a
primary notion of truth
& falsity
Not exclusory of
coherence &
pragmatist notions

Not especially
concerned with
moral matters

Not especially
concerned with
moral matters

Generally
concerned with
moral matters
Even considers
being truthful a
moral virtue
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2. Extracting the product of an argumentation
A cardinal feature of informal logic and argumentation theory is the centrality of concern for
the activity of arguing and reasoning in general. They also share in this connection a focal
concern with argument evaluation. Now, since argumentation logicians take an argument (1) to
be a social activity involving disputants or an arguer and his/her audience, (2) to appear in one or
another context, and (3) to have one or another purpose, they incline toward taking the
evaluation of an argument not to be circumscribed by considerations of ‘formal’ validity but to
involve these other factors. Thus, in just this respect, then, argumentation logicians veer toward
fusing an arguer with his/her argument and these with an argument’s context ― and they refer to
this entire ‘operation’ as an argumentation. In this way they consider themselves as closing the
gap between logic and the needs of human beings that formal logic on their view has made
unbridgeable. This being the case, they are consequently disinclined to recognize the product of
such an argumentation to be an independently existing object subject to its own evaluative
criteria. Normative concerns seem to them to lie outside the capability of formal logic and rather
to be the purview of informal logic. These logicians have aimed to close the gap between logic
and the needs of human beings, but, we believe, at the risk of eliminating an important difference
between the process of arguing and its context, on the one hand, and the product of such a
process, the ‘argumentation’ itself, on the other. In this connection, one might consider them to
run afoul of the process/product fallacy.
In relation to a proclivity to relativize cogency, and even truth and falsity, to the dispositions
of one or another audience, argumentation logicians also tend to eclipse a principal aim of logic,
that is, in its traditional or classical conception, to establish objective knowledge. Focusing on
premise acceptability and not especially on premise truth, on the pragmatics of discourse and
rules of disputation and not on the internal coherence of an argumentation, and fusing the arguer
and the argument in a unitary activity, all conspire together to blur the distinction between what
one believes to be the case and what really is the case. Perhaps the notion of context relativism
compasses these activities, and surely such a notion presides as an underlying philosophical
principle of argumentation theory. Now, considering context relativism to close the gap between
the theory and practice of logic and shunting formal logic as irrelevant diminishes the subjectobject distinction. And diminishing this distinction contributes to suppressing an important
distinction between thinking and being by conflating inference and implication. However,
reasserting a distinction between subject and object in this connection involves turning attention
to the propositions in an argumentation and to their logical relationships. Suppressing a focal
concern with objective relations among propositions, the traditional constituents of arguments
and the bailiwick of formal logic, demotes concern with implication and brings to the fore
concern with making inferences. But, now, these inferences just are cognitions; being such, they
are not construed as possibly isomorphic reflections in consciousness of objective implicational
relationships among propositions. Rather, these cognitions, these inferences, these mental states,
are just what a participant experiences, however they are effected, in one or another
argumentational context, and however they are related or unrelated to objective reality. In fact,
there is a significant chasm introduced between thinking and being that some believe either to be
unbridgeable or not worth bridging. It is no wonder that psychology and cognitive science have
become insinuated into or have been enlisted into argumentation studies. The analogue of this
might be enlisting psychologists in market advertising or political speech writing. In this respect,
then, they seem to run afoul of the epistemic/ontic fallacy.
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Now, given a tendency to suspend consideration of propositional relations, we notice also a
tendency to merge the activities of argumentation and persuasion. Again, these moves trend
argumentation theory away from matters of establishing objective knowledge and toward
subjective matters of effective and affective discourse. Addressing these matters, of course, are
worthwhile and necessary, but they might be rudderless in respect of helping human beings
know ‘what is happening.’ In this connection, we want to alert argumentation theorists that in
addition to developing rhetorical and disputational pragmatics, we ought not lose sight of the
need to develop topic neutral methods for distinguishing truth from falsity, even validity from
invalidity.
Once a logician separates the evaluation of an argument from an assessment of its
propositional relations to focus on the arguer and his/her audience, a logician then no longer
assesses arguments as objects or products, but really a logician then assesses only the persons
who present arguments and their audiences. In particular, a logician assesses a person’s skill or
lack of skill to use various instruments when making a case or persuading an audience. We, on
the other hand, wish to distinguish (1) the process, or activity, of someone arguing (including
inferential chains of reasonings in consciousness) in a given arena with a given audience, from
(2) the product of arguing, the argumentation, as itself consisting in propositions and their
implicational relations, or, at least, in sentences expressing a meaning unambiguously. We
might then easily take an argument or argumentation to be an instrument.6 In this connection,
then, we take an argumentation to be the product of arguing ― it is something objectively there,
having an independent existence, once expressed and identified, and subject then to its own
evaluation with its own objective criteria distinct from an arguer. This can only be the case if we
consider an argument, or an argumentation, to consist in propositions. However, the notion of a
“proposition” needs some clarification, which might make its inclusion more congenial to
informal logicians.
Setting aside arguments relating to mediation (with its focus on rules for managing good
discourse) and considering arguments relating to, for example, disputation and persuasion, we
recognize any number of factors that might result in misunderstanding, or failure to persuade or
to settle a dispute. Progress to a satisfactory conclusion or resolution of such arguments might
then become forestalled indefinitely. After experiencing some huffing & puffing, a guttural
growl, a rolling of eyes, etc., someone irritated might ask ― “What is that supposed to mean?!”
Disputes and differences of opinion continuing in this manner often devolve to
misunderstandings between the parties involved in a dispute. And these misunderstandings
themselves devolve to not getting the meanings of a participant’s utterance, whether expressed
by means of a sentence or a gesture. Of course, other disputes might involve no
misunderstanding where the participants tenaciously hold different agendas, etc. Here we
address those argumentations and disputations wherein any number of problems occurs,
including those infused with the traditional fallacies, or those not involving a fallacy per se but
some ignorance on the part of a participant. There is general consensus that a core concern of
settling disputes and for successful argumentation in general is to get clear about what is being
asserted or denied, and what is considered germane or irrelevant, etc. “Let us get clear about
what you mean?” “What does your sentence mean?” And we know that sentences, expressions,
and gestures are notoriously ambiguous. Thus, a mark of good argument evaluation ought to
include determining just what meaning is, or what meanings are, expressed by one or another
participant in a dispute.7
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Let us call the meaning of a sentence its proposition ― this meaning is the proposition
expressed by the sentence. Of course, a sentence might then express more than one proposition.
We do not thereby impute to such propositions any special platonic ontology; a platonic manner
of speaking is nevertheless practically helpful in respect of providing some precision of
understanding. A proposition, then, is just a meaning of a given sentence, and a sentence is a
human utterance. This is one acceptable, although not the only nor an uncontroversial, way of
specifying what a proposition is even among formal logicians. Be that as it may. And, in
addition, let us also say that a proposition can be expressed in a multiplicity of ways ― by means
of natural language sentences (whether as declarative, interrogative, imperative, exclamatory)
considered as speech-acts, or by gestures and grimaces, by body language, signs, background
setting, the shape of a table, etc. Surely, this is congenial to argumentation theorists. Still, all
these instruments might require of a specific vehicle ― a sentence, for example ― that it be
interpreted, or translated, to determine just what a given participant means by that vehicle.
Michael Gilbert and Leo Groake, for example, continue to explore this matter productively.8
However, construing argument analysis as objectifying all the dynamics of an argumentation or
dispute by extracting the propositions expressed by them ― by translating such dynamics into
the propositions they express ― seems to have been overlooked by argumentation theorists.
And, of course, any such utterances and actions that express one or another proposition
immediately become a part of the argumentation of the person expressing them. Let us, then,
take all such expressions during the course of a dispute, now translated into propositions, into
account when we assess a participant’s argument. Someone might now say:
“What proposition do you want to establish? To refute? To persuade someone to accept? Do
you know which? Okay, let’s see whether that proposition follows from the other
propositions you proffer.”
Let us not emphasize, then, whether the premises ‘support’ the conclusion, or even whether the
premises are acceptable or unacceptable to one or another participant. This is all subjective. In
this connection premise relevance becomes assessable in respect of the content of the
propositions in the premise-set as implying or not implying the conclusion.9 The project then
becomes to determine whether the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises.
So, what is the importance of this matter for informal logicians? How does this affect critical
thinking theorists? Or pragma-dialecticians? How can the accomplishments of formal logic help
argumentation theorists? First, let us again affirm that we maintain that seeking truth and
knowledge is not a fruitless endeavor, however difficult to realize, but a crucial concern of
conscientious human beings. This objective can complement the objectives of mediation and
persuasion, although it might be obstructive to them as well. Second, while we recognize the
relevance of context and audience to argument evaluation, although more to the success or
failure of a speaker/arguer to make his/her case, we circumscribe this relevance to extracting the
propositions expressed by the sentences uttered by a speaker. The importance of this matter
cannot be overemphasized as it affects both informal and formal logicians; and just here we
might acknowledge their convergence. The context of an argumentation, indeed, the entire
arena, not only frames the utterances of a participant or participants and thereby infuses them
with meaning, but this framework itself is, or parts of it are, enlisted into the argumentation itself
― it becomes part of what a participant expresses. The project of a logician, that is, of an
argument evaluator, is to identify all the propositions that constitute a participant’s
argumentation. This can be quite difficult; nevertheless, this is essential work. Still, a special
advantage to reinvesting interest in propositions, as construed in our discussion, is their being
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unambiguous. Another advantage is their becoming fixed ― and this enables a logician to
examine them objectively in respect of their internal coherence.10
4. Objective independence of truth, validity, and cogency
Reaction to the notion that an argument is “valid in virtue of its form” has generated some
understandable reprobation from informal logicians.11 Indeed, this reprobation compasses their
departure from formal logic and their affirming that an argument’s cogency is not a function of
its form ― that validity is not necessarily an essential element of a good argument, that,
moreover, making the distinction between form and matter is not a principal part of an informal
logician’s method of schematization. Grappling with validity has caused some misunderstanding
about formal logic; indeed, some formal logicians themselves do not seem clear about validity,
implication, and inference.
Perhaps in this connection we can negotiate some rapprochement between the two traditions.
We would like here to affirm that an argument is not valid in virtue of its form, that holding that
this is the case is, in fact, a careless thinking. Rather, an argument is valid, or invalid for that
matter, in virtue of the objective relationship between the propositions comprising its premise-set
and the proposition comprising its conclusion. And, moreover, we affirm that this relationship
has an ontic and not a participant dependent character, analogous to that of the truth or falsity of
a proposition.
At this juncture we must enter a caveat for our discussion and ask the reader’s indulgence.
We work from a correspondence notion of truth and apply this notion to validity.12 Thus, just as
the truth or falsity of a proposition (or the sentence expressing the proposition) corresponds to a
given state of affairs, which somehow causes the proposition to be true ― and not that the
proposition causes the state of affairs to come into existence (in the case of a true proposition) ―
so the validity of a given argument depends on objectively existent states of affairs (or possible
states of affairs). We understand the link of validity to truth as follows. A given proposition is
true or false independently of a participant’s perception or belief. Truth and falsity are ontic
properties of propositions. Of course, it is one matter for a given proposition to be true, quite
another matter for someone to know that the proposition is true. Indeed, someone might believe
it to be false; still, belief does not affect the truth or falsity of a proposition. Now, logicians
maintain correctly that it is impossible for true propositions to imply a false proposition ― a
given false proposition cannot be a logical consequence of, or be implied by, true propositions.
One way that a logician has traditionally demonstrated that this is the case has been to employ
deductive reasoning, as, for example, in the case of indirect proof. Such a state of affairs ―
namely, that true propositions cannot imply a false proposition ― is demonstrated by assuming
that true propositions imply a false proposition and then carrying the reasoning through to
generate a contradiction. The contradiction signals an absurdity, which itself is a reflection of an
impossible state of affairs.13 Now, of course, a contradiction can exist, in the sense that someone
holds two propositions both of which cannot be true together; but the state of affairs denoted by
the contradiction cannot obtain ― it is impossible that a given property both belong and not
belong at the same time in the same respect to the same object. Another way that logicians have
traditionally treated this matter, at least as far back as Aristotle in Metaphysics 4, is to show that
every proposition is deducible from a contradiction. This defines unintelligibility. If we accept
the correspondence between (1) the impossibility of opposing states of affairs obtaining
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simultaneously in the same object with (2) the unintelligibility of a contradiction, then we can
accept that the ontology underlying truth and falsity is identical with the ontology underlying
validity and invalidity that makes it impossible that true propositions imply a false proposition.
This ontology, moreover, takes argument evaluation out of relativistic and arbitrary
considerations to provide for a formal assessment of implicational relationships among
propositions. Thus, from a correspondence point of view, validity, as truth, is grounded in
objective being, just because invalidity points to an impossible state of affairs. Again, this
ontology establishes these matters to be participant independent. Thus, just as a participant
might correctly or incorrectly believe that a given proposition is true or false, so might a
participant believe a given argument to be valid that is in fact invalid, or believe that an invalid
argument is valid, or valid when it is valid, or invalid when invalid. Of course, the problem for
human beings is to determine that a given argument is valid or invalid. This is an epistemic
matter. And in this connection we would like to affirm that the gap between what is believed to
be the case and what is the case ought to be closed by establishing knowledge, however difficult
this is to obtain. Argumentation theorists seem to have circumvented this approach by shifting
concern away from considering propositional relations and placing it on assessing inferential
links in the minds of participants.
Addressing the matter of determining that a given argument is valid or invalid moves our
discussion to consider cogency and fallaciousness. We believe that, just as truth and falsity and
validity and invalidity are ontic properties of propositions and arguments respectively, so are
cogency and fallaciousness properties of argumentations, but now considered as consisting only
in propositions. Again, analogously, a participant might correctly or incorrectly believe that a
given argumentation is cogent or fallacious when the argumentation is cogent or when it is
fallacious. One traditional way to establish knowledge of an argument’s validity is to find a
chain of reasoning that is cogent in the context of the bounding P-c argument (see below n15),
which thereby links, in the mind of a participant, the conclusion proposition to the propositions
in a premise-set as a logical consequence. This is traditionally called a deduction, and deductive
reasoning embraces a principle of deducibility that we might formulate as follows:
A given proposition c is formally deducible from a given set of propositions P when there
exists a finite sequence of propositions that ends with c and begins with P such that each
proposition in the sequence from P is either a member of P or a proposition generated from
earlier propositions solely by means of stipulated deduction rules.
The notion of deducibility is familiar to logicians, even to those who are dissatisfied with the
formalism of deductive logic. Still, when we consider the ‘stipulated deduction rules’ and relax
our criticism of formal logic, we might notice something agreeable to informal logicians, but
previously underrepresented by them. A traditional deduction rule, such as hypothetical
syllogism, disjunctive syllogism, or detachment, is just an elementary argument pattern all of
whose concrete object language argument instances are valid.14 What is interesting to note in
this connection is that the validity of each of these argument instances is an ontic property and
not participant dependent ― and this ontic character is reflected in the elementary argument
pattern. Let us refer to this ontic property as the argument pattern’s being panvalid.15 However,
equally important, such a panvalid elementary argument pattern possesses a special epistemic
quality ― namely, its being easily recognized. Thus, encountering an instance of an argument
fitting such a panvalid pattern indicates that the given argument is valid and now known to be
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valid. This epistemic quality is especially efficacious in the case of longer deductive discourses,
where encountering a string of such argument instances links a given conclusion as following
logically (we might say ontically) from given propositions. Formal deducibility, while having an
ontic underpinning, amounts to a participant finding and constructing a cogent chain of reasoning
that is just a sequence of propositions that are conclusions of such valid elementary arguments.
This defines cogency.
Let us now say that an argumentation is a three-part system consisting in a set of propositions
called premises, a single proposition called a conclusion, and a sequence of propositions that are
conclusions to elementary arguments called a chain of reasoning. Given this understanding of an
argumentation, we can see that a cogent chain of reasoning is a sequence of interlinked
conclusions of valid elementary arguments. Leaving aside the cognitive aspect, the ‘getting it,’
we see that cogency is an ontic property of an ordered sequence of conclusion propositions of
elementary valid arguments. Again, it is one thing for the sequence to be cogent; it is another
thing for someone to understand that this is so.16 To deny that cogency is an ontic property of
such a sequence of propositions is to reject the principle of transitivity of consequence, namely:
“every consequence of a consequence of a given proposition is again a consequence of that
proposition” (cited in Corcoran 1989a: 34-35). Cogency is an ontic property of a ‘good’
argumentation, specifically, of a deduction, and its counterpart, fallaciousness, is an ontic
property of a ‘bad’ argument, namely, of a fallacy. Table 2 displays these matters. Considering
argumentations in respect of their consisting in propositions extricates both deductions and
fallacies from participant relativity and places responsibility for their recognition on participants.
Thus, to hold that the cogency of a deduction presupposes knowledge of the validity of the
component elementary arguments affirms its independence and helps to secure obtaining
objective knowledge.
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PROPOSITONS AND ARGUMENTATION17

PROPOSITION

P-c ARGUMENT

ARGUMENTATION

P
p

P

?c

?c

p1
p2
.
.
pn-1
cn
A given argumentation is either:
COGENT or FALLACIOUS

A given argument is either:
VALID or INVALID

A given proposition is either:
TRUE or FALSE

Logical consequence

1.

1.
2.

2.

P implies c
All the information in c is contained
in P

3.
IMPLICATION
Table 2

12

Deduction: a cogent argumentation that links
conclusion to premises as a logical consequence
Demonstration: a cogent argumentation with true
premises ― CONTINUITY of IMPLICATION
Fallacy: a non-cogent (fallacious) argumentation ―
DISCONTINUITY of IMPLICATION
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As it turns out, logicians, at least as far back as Aristotle, have discovered that there are
certain forms or argument patterns among propositions or sets of propositions such that when a
given argument fits one of these patterns the argument instance is valid. The pattern reflects an
ontic state of affairs ― it is a part of ‘the nature of things.’ As with truth and falsity, it is not that
such a pattern causes an argument to be valid or that such a pattern causes a corresponding state
of affairs to exist, but, rather, that the state of affairs (or possible state of affairs) causes the
pattern to be panvalid. As we do not hypostatize propositions, we do not hypostatize their
patterns ― we might treat them as reflections in consciousness of objectively existing states of
affairs. Whatever their special ontic status, they are nevertheless objective in their
correspondence between objects in consciousness and objects in the independently existing
world. Recognizing these patterns, however, is epistemic, and something essential for human
beings in coming to know ‘what is happening.’ Thus, it is not that an argument is valid in virtue
of its form; rather a given argument is recognized to be valid in virtue of recognizing that it fits
one or another panvalid pattern. Recognizing a panvalid pattern such as modus ponens, for
example, establishes knowledge of logical consequence in shorter or longer discourses. And
knowledge of logical consequence is no small matter of inconsequence ― it is the stuff of
knowledge, but it does not compass all knowing. Thus, it is one matter to know that a given
proposition follows logically from other propositions; it is another matter to know that the
proposition itself is true or false, since we know that a given proposition that is a logical
consequence of other propositions is not necessarily true just because it is a logical consequence.
These are two different kinds of knowing. Both kinds of knowing are important for human
understanding. And both kinds of knowing require that a participant learn (1) how to determine
whether a given proposition is or is not a logical consequence of other propositions and (2) how
to determine whether a given proposition is true or false. Thus, in respect of deductive reasoning
as a constituent of knowledge, whether of coherence or correspondence, we ought to embrace the
findings of earlier logicians who discovered certain ‘formal’ patterns that help human beings to
recognize in an argument that its conclusion follows ‘logically’ from its premises.
4. What formal logic has to offer argumentation theory
We have aimed to resurrect for informal logicians the crucial importance of considering the
formal relationships among propositions that constitute argumentations. Doing this does not
diminish the importance of an argument’s context; rather, it redirects its importance for the
purpose of identifying the propositions expressed by a participant in an argument in a given
context. The importance of doing this is at least twofold. First, it enables someone to isolate
precisely what is at stake in an argumentation ― that is, just what is the conclusion a participant
wishes to establish, what are the premises, and what constitutes the chain of reasoning linking or
failing to link the conclusion to the premises. Establishing the constituent propositions of an
argumentation eliminates ambiguity and prepares for objective argument analysis. Second, it
extricates argument cogency from the quagmire of subjectivity, that is, once the propositions
have been identified. It thereby helps to objectify not only an argumentation for impartial
analysis but also the truth and falsity of the propositions constituting an argumentation. The
outcome of this process might be that the participants have to suspend judgment about the truth
or falsity of their propositions. Be that as it may. However, they will also have distinguished
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that pursuit from the pursuit of whether or not what someone says follows from other things the
person says or supposes or even leaves unstated as smuggled premises.
Knowledge of formal validity, then, is no small matter for human beings wanting to ‘know
what is happening,’ whether this pertains to what transpires in an argumentation or what bears
on, for example, the natural and social worlds. Now, if we take the science of logic to be a part
of epistemology and epistemology to be concerned with examining how human beings establish
knowledge, then logic becomes applied epistemology. Even formal logic, then, is always poised
for its application in this connection. One project of epistemology is to determine means for
establishing knowledge of the truth or falsity of propositions relating to one or another domain.
This project generally lies outside of deductive logic, save for applying two formal methods that
aim at knowledge. (1) The hypothetico-deductive method is used to disconfirm a hypothesis or
proving it to be false when the truth of correlative premises is known. (2) The deductive
method is used most often in axiomatic discourse for proving a hypothesis to follow logically;
but when the premises are known to be true, this method establishes the truth of the conclusion
— this is a demonstration. In this connection, formal logic has defined deduction, refutation,
and demonstration; and now we suggest a formal definition of fallacy.18 We have seen how
ontology and logic are intimate companions. Formal logic has also provided in this connection
methods useful for discovering hidden consequences of propositions.
Another project of epistemology is to determine a foundation for and to discover the means
by which we establish knowledge of logical consequence. Formal logic has established the
principle of form.19 It has developed the method of counterargument and method of
counterinterpretation to establish knowledge of invalidity. But more important, the theoretical
apparatus of formal logic has established the hallmarks of intelligibility.20 Here we can cite its
having articulated the law of contradiction and the law of excluded middle that provide an
ontic underpinning for intelligible discourse.21 Its having treated the principle of consistency
that every true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition complements these
laws. This principle also underlies intelligible discourse and is equally applicable to various
notions of truth, whether a correspondence, a coherence, or a pragmatist notion. Formal logic
has defined logical consequence as an ontic property existing between propositions.22 This
notion underpins intelligible discourse by which we recognize, for example, the incoherence of a
paradox or know that true propositions cannot imply a false proposition. Especially important in
connection with logical consequence is the formal logical notion of cogency that we have
developed in this discussion. Cogency consists in linking the conclusion propositions of valid
elementary arguments sequentially as a chain of reasoning in an argumentation. In this
connection, formal logic has articulated the principle of transitivity of consequence, that every
consequence of a consequence of a given proposition is again a consequence of that proposition.
In its commitment to overcome ignorance and fallibility as much as possible, formal logic
has worked with a notion of precision in thinking as exemplified, for example, in the ideal of a
logically perfect language. Such abstract, formal languages have repelled argumentation
theorists just because of their formalism and their distance from ordinary discourse. However,
working with this notion enables someone to take ordinary discourse and extract the propositions
a participant expresses using such natural language. Part of this process, for example, involves
identifying ambiguity, which, then, can enlist the work of semantics and linguistics, if only for
helping to make more precise the logical form of a given proposition as a part of an argument.
Aristotle long ago recognized the need to eliminate ambiguity for the sake of intelligible
discourse; perhaps he set such a precedent for precise language when he required that a
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proposition ‘affirm or deny one thing of one thing.’ We might recall that in Sophistical
Refutations he remarked that many ‘bad’ arguments result from a participant’s ignorance (1) of
what a refutation is (a deduction of the contradictory of a given proposition) and (2) of what a
proposition is. And just in respect of intelligible and precise discourse, Aristotle also formulated
in Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Sophistical Refutations, and Metaphysics the notion of
universe of discourse by which one determines what is germane to a specific discourse. Again,
a ‘bad’ argument might devolve to a participant’s reasoning cogently but outside the domain of
the topic; surely informalists might refer to this notion in respect of their concerns with
relevance.
5. Concluding remarks
An adept speaker skilled in argumentation and fallacy theory, formal logic, the theatre of
presentation, and familiar with his/her audience’s predilections marshals all this information
instrumentally to persuade an audience of one or another belief. Such a speaker’s persuasive
success rests on three principal factors, all of which pertain to the conditions of an audience: (1)
participant ignorance of formal logic, and fallacy theory in this connection; (2) participant
ignorance of facts and objective knowledge; and (3) participants’ prejudices, their lacking a clear
commitment to obtaining truth and a willingness to suspend judgment toward that end.
Perceiving that formal logic could not rescue such participants — be they persons subjected to a
political speech, the evening news, commercials, etc, — and moved perhaps by a democratic
impulse, informal logicians and critical thinking theorists emerged to fill that vacuum and to
empower persons to make discerning judgments. However, centering their criticism on the
‘baroque spirals’ thought to have been spun by formal mathematical logicians has resulted in
some of these logicians subordinating the place of validity among the features of a good
argument.
Critical thinking theorists, pragma-dialecticians, and informal logicians have aimed to
diminish the gap between logic and the practices of human beings. However, in the process they
have diminished the role formal logic might play in closing that gap. However, by relativizing
cogency to the dispositions of an audience, by fusing the arguer with his/her argumentation, and
by attending to the inferential links a person experiences during an argumentation, they have
widened a gap between belief and knowledge that diminishes a concern with objectivity. We
have aimed to reassert more forcefully the gap between ignorance or belief and knowledge in
respect of (1) truth and falsity, (2) validity and invalidity, and (3) cogency and fallaciousness.
Relativizing these notions tends to obscure this gap to the detriment of human understanding and
enduring conflict resolution. Logicians need more determinately to distinguish the presentation
of an argumentation from the argumentation itself and in this way recognize that an
argumentation can be evaluated independently according to the criteria developed by formal
logic. Logicians could then focus on developing a person’s ability to avoid mistakes in
reasoning by promoting (1) knowledge and command of information and (2) knowledge of
logical consequence as complemented by (3) the pragmatics of discourse.
Informal logicians as much as formal logicians have foundational metasystematic concerns.
The one has emphasized what formal logicians might consider ‘extra-logical’ matters, such as
the pragmatics of discourse; the other has emphasized the ‘formal’ matters relating to validity
and logical consequence. However, the interests of the two might have been artificially counter-

15

G. Boger’s “A Possible Rapprochement of Informal Logic with Formal Logic”

posed. While it is all well and good to examine and to become skilled at using rhetorical
methods of persuasion and methods for negotiating a dispute to an agreeable conclusion, we
must not lose sight of an enduring concern to know the truth. In this connection, formal
logicians have developed models — whether of formal or natural languages, of deduction
systems, or of argumentations, etc. These formal models serve as ideals against which not only a
logician but an ordinary person ‘turned logician’ can assess everyday discourse.23 There is
nothing wrong with positing an ideal, such as the notion of a circle, even to refer to this notion as
‘circularity itself’ — or of ‘idealizing’ unambiguous sentences with the notion of proposition.
The harm occurs when someone hypostatizes such notions as having independent existence,
which then ‘lord over’ human beings. Informal logicians and argumentation theorists have
properly resisted this hypostatization of the so-called forms of thought, but at the expense of
throwing the baby out with the bath water. Perhaps our approach to embracing certain formal
matters might be agreeable to informal logicians.

Notes
1 In this discussion we use the expressions ‘argumentation theory’ and ‘argumentation
movement’ (and correlative expressions) to designate the entire sweep of trends challenging in
one or another respect the project of formal logic; without considering their differences, we focus
on a similarity they share. In addition, ‘formalist’ (and ‘formalism’) is used to denote a
traditional formal logician and ‘informalist’ (and ‘informalism’) is used in a corresponding way.
We also use the word ‘argumentation’ throughout the early part of our discussion in a way
familiar to informal logicians; however, in §2 we specify another more traditional meaning.
2 The methods of counterargument and counterinterpretation require as their ground the
method of fact ― that is, having available an instance of an argument known to be invalid
having true premises and a false conclusion. A counterargument is such an argument, one
known to be invalid and having the same form as a given argument whose invalidity is to be
determined. In a counterargument the logical constants remain the same but the non-logical
constants are changed. In a counterinterpretation the grammar and words remain the same but
they are interpreted differently. On the notion of argument form, see nn15 & 19 below. In this
discussion we sometimes use the expression ‘the premises are true’ elliptically for ‘the
propositions [or sentences] in the role of premises are true’ as also ‘the conclusion is false’ for
‘the proposition [or sentence] in the role of conclusion is false’; etc. This applies also to
‘premise acceptability.’
3 At an earlier OSSA Conference in May 1999, we argued that the fallacies discussed by
Aristotle in Sophistical Refutations might be analyzable more traditionally according to the
syllogistic patterns established in Prior Analytics A4-6. David Hitchcock was the commentator.
Our respective discussions are available in the Conference Proceedings published on a CD in
1998.
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4 We cite relativism and subjectivism here in their more pejorative senses, however, without
meaning to disregard their affirmative content. Our criticism is familiar.
5 This table is not comprehensive and only provides a sketch for the special focus of our
discussion. Participants provided helpful comments during a session of the OSSA Conference IL
@ 25 in Windsor, ONT that improved the table. Particularly helpful were comments by
Professor Daniel Cohen of Colby College. Professor Robert Binkley of Western Ontario
University suggested including a fourth kind of argument, namely, dialogue.
6 We have dealt more fully with treated arguments as instruments in a paper presented in April
2002 at the conference Mistakes of Reason: A Conference in Honour of John Woods. The
University of Toronto Press will publish conference proceedings edited by Professor Kent
Peacock.
7 This, of course, applies equally well to someone trying to get a matter clear in his/her own
mind ― a kind of internal dialogue.
8 We cannot answer the question of whether human beings can think without words and
language. Here, however, we take it that language is required for conscious thinking. In this
connection, then, however human beings might express themselves, all such expressions
intending to assert a meaning (a proposition) are subject to formal logical analysis.
9 John Corcoran (1998), in particular, has developed an information-theoretic notion of logical
consequence that informal logicians might find agreeable.
10 Surely disputational, argumentative, and persuasive discourses, as well as mediation, are
open to objective evaluation according to coherence and correspondence notions. Below we
consider them in relation to a correspondence notion of truth.
11 We wonder whether a source of their dissatisfaction with formal logic is their seizing on its
treatment of material implication without distinguishing it from logical implication. An
argument is materially valid just in case either the proposition that is the conclusion is true or at
least one of the propositions in the premise-set is false. This is the case irrespective of the
argument’s propositional content. In this connection we might note that Aristotle and Quine
thought of logic as a kind of formal epistemology rather than as formal ontology along the lines
of Frege and Russell. Perhaps there are trends within formal logic more amicable to informal
logicians.
12 Of course, a correspondence notion of truth embraces coherence, but a coherence notion of
truth might not embrace correspondence. Again, treating principally correspondence
circumscribes our discussion.
13 Aristotle in Prior Analytics B2 did precisely this in the case of Barbara. ‘Barbara’ names a
syllogistic argument pattern all of whose instances are valid as ‘modus ponens’ names such a
pattern for propositional logic. Cf. n15 below.
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14 The distinction between logic from metalogic reproduces the distinction between use and
mention. Informal logicians no less that formal logicians treat metasystematic matters; only their
respective emphases have been different.
15 We use ‘panvalid’ of an argument pattern when every instance of the pattern is a valid
argument. Using ‘panvalid’ helps to make the category distinction between arguments and
patterns of arguments. “Form” and “pattern” are distinguished as follows. A given argument
has one and only one form, but might fit any number of patterns. For example, every argument,
valid or invalid, fits the pattern ‘P-c’, where ‘P’ denotes the premise-set and ‘c’ the conclusion.
‘Barbara’ names a panvalid pattern for Aristotle’s syllogistic logic; ‘modus ponens’ names a
panvalid pattern for modern propositional logic. In addition, then, some patterns might be
paninvalid, having only invalid argument instances, and some neutrovalid, having some valid
and some invalid instances.
16 The ideal, of course, is that the relationship between the sequence of propositions (capturing
objective meaning) that are conclusions of elementary arguments and the sequence of ‘getting’
those propositions in the mind of a participant is isomorphic.
17 For explanation of ‘P’ and ‘c’, see n15 above. The ‘p’ and the ‘p’ with subscripts ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘n1’ in this table denote propositions. In addition, the sequence indicated by ‘p1, p2 … pn-1’
identifies a chain of reasoning.
18 A formal fallacy theory would include (1) a definition of fallacy and (2) a method of formal
analysis. Using the above notion of argumentation, formal logic offers the following definition.
A fallacy is an argumentation in which one or more of the following occurs: (1) the conclusion is
not a logical consequence of the premise-set; (2) the chain of reasoning is not cogent, whether or
not the argument bounding the chain of reasoning is valid; or (3) the chain of reasoning is cogent
but not in context pf the bounding P-c argument. These considerations are ontic features of the
fallacy, and thus they are independent of a participant’s recognition.
19 This principle states that every argument in the same form as a given valid argument is valid;
that every argument in the same form as a given invalid argument is invalid. An argument has
one and only one form, although a given argument might fit any number of patterns (for
example, every argument fits the pattern ‘P-c’).
20 Our list here only indicates some contributions that formal logic might make for evaluating
natural language discourse; it is intended to emphasize intelligibility, which is required for
intelligible discourse.
21 An expression of the law of contradiction in relation to states of affairs holds that it is
impossible that a given property both belong and not belong to a given object at the same time in
the same respect. Another expression of this law but in relation to propositions holds that it is
impossible that a given proposition is both true and not true at the same time in the same respect.
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22 Two statements of logical consequence are: (1) c is a logical consequence of P if every true
interpretation of P is a true interpretation of c; (2) c is a logical consequence of P if all the
information contained in c is already contained in P.
23 We might easily recognize that the notion of a logically perfect language, which is a
mathematical artifact, is useful for working with natural language discourse.
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